Contemporary literature in the philosophy of language seems to have come to a general consensus that deception is not fundamentally tied to with lying. This approach to lying undermines what we take to be wrong with lying and can leave us saying very little about why we have such strong emotional responses when lied to. My project aims to show that the main counterexamples to the traditional view of lying are semantically problematic in a particular way, and that the reason they purport the two concepts (lying and an intention to deceive) should be divorced is not the reason why these counterexamples do not count as cases of lying. I will argue that instead, there are plenty of explanatory advantages that the traditional view has over its counterparts. These include accounting for (genuine) cases of bald-faced lies, the distinction between lying and bullshit, being in line with our moral intuitions, as well as the ways in which lying be manipulative. Overall, I seek to restore some amount of lost credence to what should be the uncontroversial definition of lying.